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ABSTRACT
After decades of reluctance, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries
are now more engaged within the global sustainability agenda. Though
they historically sought to coordinate strategies, differences in
environmental diplomacy and participation modes currently exist. This
article examines these differences and links diplomacy to political and
economic considerations during different eras. It maps positions,
activism in multilateral agreements, and investigates recent changes in
light of increased domestic pressures and the rise of formalised national
visions. The increased global environmental engagement of GCC
countries can yield better outcomes, but environmental pillars do not
feature highly in their current visions.
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Introduction
Since the 1950s, countries around the world have increasingly participated in shaping and imple-
menting global environmental agreements and sustainable development norms. By the end of the
twentieth century, the global environmental governance system had taken shape, resulting in
large conferences and landmark conventions and commitments. The most significant and recent
ones arguably have been the Earth Summit 2012, the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In light of these agreements and the urgency of action on
issues such as climate change, international cooperation and diplomacy can be expected to intensify
or at least increase incrementally (Keohane and Victor 2016). Not only were states becoming increas-
ingly more active in deliberating environmental outcomes, but non-governmental actors, businesses,
markets and networks of actors were also engaging in these spaces of public deliberations and
“empowered” (authoritative) decision-making (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011). The global environ-
mental issues on the negotiation table are substantive, ranging from more concrete actions on
climate, biodiversity, pollution, and renewables, to broader discussions on development goals,
environmental financing, and the future of environmental governance structures. The more conten-
tious issues are those that require immediate national action, cuts or restructuring, such as the
climate change challenge. The climate issue is a good example of an area in the global environmental
governance where the environmental diplomacy of nation states is fully utilised. It also reflects the
wider geopolitics of environmental threats and how countries perceive these threats and choose
to react (e.g. Barnett 2007). This article examines the involvement of Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries in climate diplomacy, alongside their participation in UN-based international environ-
mental conferences such as the Earth Summits, leading to shaping and co-adopting the SDGs.
Together, climate change agreements such as the 2015 Paris Agreement and UN-based goals such
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as the SDGs represent the two key pillars of the current global sustainability agenda, and the most
relevant international reference points for the national development visions of GCC countries.
The study of participation modes of developing nations in the development of the global sustain-
ability agenda reveals much about national economic and sustainable development priorities.
Further, global agreements have some influence on the willingness of states to tackle environmental
issues, as well as the content and convergence of adopted policies (Knill 2005; Bernstein and
Cashore 2012). For the GCC countries, such an influence might have not been evident in the
past. However, the recently adopted ambitious visions and post-carbon strategies that have
sought to diversify economies and decrease local consumptions are formally linked to global con-
sensus or referred to in progress reports on the SDGs or the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the environ-
mental diplomacy of GCC countries is even more revealing of their environmental choices. The long-
standing opposition of Saudi Arabia to carbon reductions, the engagement of Qatar on climate
change by hosting international climate negotiations in 2012, and the interest of United Arab Emi-
rates in promoting renewable energies and hosting international organisations in this area, are some
examples of this region’s diplomatic stances that have reflected differing local interests. In environ-
ment-related negotiations, GCC countries have been participating as a part of the block of develop-
ing countries, the G77. In general, developing countries’ participation in global environmental
governance has evolved from scepticism and opposition, to involvement and engagement
(Najam 2005). However, the evolution of GCC countries’ participation and environmental diplomacy
stand out as a special case due to the strong financial positions of these countries within the group
of developing countries, their relative novelty as relevant actors on the environmental diplomacy
scene, their carbon-based growth and consumption models, and their relatively coherent position-
ing on major issues. We highlight these factors in the participation and diplomacy of GCC countries
towards the global sustainability agenda, and link recent outcomes to the current economic trans-
formation policies in the region.
The global sustainability agenda and (environmental) diplomacy – origins and
terminology
Environmental diplomacy in the narrow sense of political science relates to negotiations over environ-
mental issues by nation states. In a broader sense, it is an interdisciplinary endeavour to analyse
environmental conflict resolution and negotiations among different stakeholders, as well as the use
of the environment in disputes and peace-making (Ali and Vladich 2016). Although the term is now
used in different contexts such as environmental preferences of states, natural resources conflicts,
and collaboration modes among environmental stakeholders, its original use was more aligned
with negotiations and treaty-making of nation states (Susskind 1994). The use of the term is closely
associated with the emergence of the global sustainability agenda, which we understand here as
the UN-led efforts to define a consensus and roadmap for action on urgent environmental issues, par-
ticularly through commitments, declarations and action plans during sustainable development con-
ferences (i.e. Earth Summits) and international conventions. There have been several historical
precursors to the current global sustainability agenda. However, major global sustainability definitions,
milestones and agreements date back to the latter half of the twenty-first century, and have emerged
from UN-based processes, with the Earth Chapter as possibly the only exception to these UN-domi-
nated processes since it witnessed strong leadership from civil society (see Wass et al. 2011).
The use of the term environmental diplomacy also coincides with major UN conferences. While
environmental diplomatic efforts date back to the whaling regulation convention of 1946, the
term acquired currency after the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) of 1972
in Stockholm (Ali and Vladich 2016). Its wide dissemination and use can be traced to the
period after the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de
Janeiro (Earth Summit) (Benedick 1999; Ali and Vladich 2016). Therefore, environmental diplomacy
gained attention through the rise of the global sustainability agenda and can be seen as
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inseparable from the UN-based multilateral negotiations, Earth Summits and resulting agreements
since 1972 (Chasek 2001). This state-centred and UN-led diplomacy is often based on international
environmental law and characterised as “global” environmental diplomacy (Tolba, Rummel-Bulska,
and Molina 1998).
Since the late 1990s, there has been an expansion of actors and participation modes in environ-
mental policy. Even before the emergence of the modern global sustainability agenda, Caldwell
(1988) noted that national governments alone were becoming less able to attain the objectives of
international environmental cooperation through diplomacy, and thus a transnational environmental
administration was necessary. Global environmental governance is the system through which gov-
ernments, together with civil society and businesses, regulate and enforce negotiated or self-organ-
ised, actions, tasks and functions in order to solve environmental problems of common concern to
people across nations. Similarly, the expansion of environmental diplomacy is related to the rise of
multinational corporations and NGOs, which both manage strong national operations in some
countries and maintain important ties with some states. According to Broadhurst and Ledgerwood
(1998), interactions between these three actors have gradually changed the notions of diplomacy,
sovereignty, representation and participation. Accordingly, states are increasingly reliant on
cooperation, knowledge and services provided by non-state actors, who also influence and partici-
pate in negotiated outcomes among states.
There have been several environmental diplomacy studies in the context of specific Earth Summits,
conventions or leading countries and regions such as the USA, Japan the EU. While reviewing these is
beyond the scope of this paper, one can mention the central notion of nation states changing their
negotiation stances by embracing more actions on environmental issues (see Najam 2005 for devel-
oping countries). Furthermore, partnerships with non-state actors and regional coalitions seem to be
another recurrent and increasingly prominent theme (see Torney and Cross 2017 for the EU).
In this article, we use a rather conventional understanding of environmental diplomacy with a
focus on the nation states of the GCC region. Although we also elaborate on the role of international
industrial relations in influencing the negotiating stances of certain countries, state-centric diplomacy
during the UN-based milestones forming the global sustainability agenda is our focus. The GCC’s
environmental diplomacy has been relatively under-researched despite it being a particularly inter-
esting case from the Global South. This case exemplarily shows that environmental diplomacy in
developing countries characterised by carbon-based growth and financial prosperity, being practiced
as a sovereign function based on national economic interests and in service of other state interests.
Using secondary literature and data on global environmental agreements, we illustrate the environ-
mental diplomacy legacies by tracing back participation modes in UN-led initiatives throughout
different historic, political and economic transformation periods. This historic view and the state com-
parisons approach reveal that modern states in the GCC region have been one of the most reluctant
participants in sustainability discussions. It is also evident that GCC countries have only recently
begun to engage internationally and align the global sustainability agenda to their national
agendas, at different paces.
Tracing environmental diplomacy and participation modes
The early beginnings preceding oil dominance
GCC states are characterised by a primarily arid desert landscape with few coastal areas andmountain
ranges, limited annual rainfall, scarce groundwater reserves, and high salinity. The region is sur-
rounded by four water bodies – the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the Gulf of
Oman – positioning it as a region with a shared maritime culture based on pearling, fishing, and
long-distance trade between Arabs and the African, European, and Asian continents (Kannan 2012;
Onley et al. 2016). Despite minimal natural resources, caravan trade was sustained across an inter-
linked system with agricultural villages and oases, and maritime trade and seafaring and pearling
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continued. Consequently, human settlement and modes of engagement with the environment were
dictated largely by this context (Potter 2009).
Literature on how Gulf people perceived and interacted with this natural habitat is scant, yet
anthropological accounts relay a rich social fabric and a distinct way of life and tradition (e.g. Al-
Ghanim 1998) which transformed dramatically with the predominance of oil in the early 1970s.
The use of oil transformed not only the physical environment, but brought with it tremendous reper-
cussions on society, economy, and geography. Unprecedented levels of socio-economic transform-
ation resulted in rapid industrialisation, inefficient use of resources, unplanned urbanisation, and
large-scale consumption patterns. The magnitude, speed, and combination, together with limited
natural resources, resulted in a set of environmental issues that stand out as distinct to the Gulf
countries. High rates of migration occurred as Gulf countries opened up to Arab neighbours and
to Western oil companies, alongside extremely rapid urbanisation and soil erosion in the region
(Potter 2009). The decline of agriculture had both environmental and social consequences. For
example, where the falaj system of collective irrigation was common (in Oman), the abandonment
of villages as urbanisation grew led to weakening social bonds and environmental consequences.
Elsewhere in the region, landowners with stronger purchasing power began overexploiting under-
ground water reserves with modern drills, an already dwindling natural resource. Commercialised
agriculture and intensified world-scale production concentrated in certain areas in Saudi Arabia
also led to the depletion of fossil aquifers (Onley et al. 2016). Concerned academics and community
leaders began to warn about this rapid untapped growth and its impact on future generations. Riad
(1981, 7) was one of the first to warn about what he referred to as “an aggressive form of ‘Petro-Urban-
ism’” which, in his view, “undermined, with unparalleled suddenness, the roots of an ecosystem which
reflected a perfect adaptation to an environment many generations old”.
As livelihoods and human settlements shifted, more complex economies emerged that required
increasing regulation. The governments’ main concern, however, was to introduce regulatory mech-
anisms and arbitration regimes to maintain control over commerce and an exponentially growing
economy (Onley et al. 2016). The arrival and hegemony of international oil companies also played
a role in transforming the political economy and migration/urbanisation patterns in the Gulf, and
their share of control (Zahlan 1998). As will be evident in this paper, this preoccupation with econ-
omic growth has tended to override attention to its environmental consequences and the responsi-
bility that should accompany it. Once oil concessions were signed, the Gulf region opened up to the
world and previous restrictions under the British mandate were lifted.
Reluctance in the era of high-growing carbon economies
The high growth era in the GCC region started in the 1970s and coincided with the emergence of the
global sustainability agenda after the first major UN conference in 1972 in Stockholm. The GCC began
to exert more control over oil supply and prices as the global demand for oil increased rapidly
between 1965 and 1973 (Fattouh 2011). The formation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in 1960 played an important role in influencing the oil price that was determined
by multinational oil companies with an oligopolistic position until the mid-1970s. During the 1960s
and early 1970s, OPEC administered the level of oil prices, increased oil output (global oil production
share of OPEC countries was around 51% in 1973) and increased equity participation of OPEC gov-
ernments in oil produced by multinationals (Fattouh 2011). In the late 1970s, GCC countries
became even more independent and in control of their supply of oil as, particularly in the aftermath
of nationalisation policies of the 1979 Iranian revolution, many countries in the region established
national oil companies that replaced some oil multinationals. These national oil companies grew
in power and are considered today as the prime revenue generators for the rentier states which
also use them to retain power, distribute oil and gas money, or finance sovereign trust funds and
investments abroad (Losman 2010). Much of the investment and reserve holdings of GCC countries
went to the USA, while oil deals closed in dollars helped stabilised its value. In addition, the US market
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was of great significance to GCC countries. The deregulation of the control of oil imports and exports
by the USA in the early 1980s, and later by other industrialised states, led to OPEC countries giving up
administrated prices and ushered in the era of oil markets (Momani 2008).
Although growth in individual countries happened at different paces and has continued,
especially when oil and gas prices are high, between the 1970s up until the early 2000s can be con-
sidered as the era where the bulk of economic and demographic growth took place in the GCC
Table 1. Environmental multilateral agreements of GCC countries.
Conventions (dates of adoption,
entering force)
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
S R S R S R S R S R S R
Basel Convention (1989, 1992) 1989 1992 1989 1993 1995 1995 1989 1990 1989 1992
Cartagena Protocol (2000, 2003) 2012 2017 2003 2007 2007 2014
Basel Protocol on Liability and
Compensation (1999)
2013
Convention on Biological Diversity
(1992, 1993)
1992 1996 1992 2002 1992 1995 1992 1996 2001 1992 2000
Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (1973, 1975)
2012 2012 2002 2002 2008 2008 2001 2001 1996 1996 1990 1990
Convention on Migratory Species
(1979, 1983)
1991 1991 2016
Kyoto Protocol (1997, 2005) 2006 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
Minamata Convention on Mercury
(2013, 2017)
2013 2015 2013 2015
Montreal Protocol (1987, 1989) 1990 1992 1999 1996 1993 1989
Nagoya Protocol (2010, 2014) 2017 2017 2014
Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur
Supplementary Protocol
(additional liability rules) (2010,
2018)
2014
Paris Agreement (2015, 2016) 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2016 2016 2016 2016
Ramsar Convention (1971, 1975) 1998 1997 2015 2015 2013 2013 2007 2007
Rotterdam Convention (1998, 2004) 2012 1998 2006 2000 2004 2000 2002
Stockholm Convention (2001, 2004) 2002 2006 2001 2006 2002 2005 2004 2002 2012 2001 2002
UN Watercourses Convention (1997,
2014)
2002
United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification (1994,
1996)
1997 1995 1997 1996 1999 1997 1998
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(1992, 1994)
1992 1994 1994 1992 1995 1996 1994 1995
United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1982, 1994)
1982 1985 1982 1986 1983 1989 1984 2002 1984 1996 1982
Vienna Convention (1985, 1988) 1990 1992 1999 1996 1993 1989
Total number of ratified treaties 14 16 14 15 15 17
Average years between the
adoption of a multilateral
agreement and ratification (only
calculated for agreements ratified
by all GCC countries)
8.5 8.5 8.25 9.25 7.8 6
Notes: Acronyms and full convention names as follows. S: Signature; R: Ratification; Basel Convention: The Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; Cartagena Protocol: The Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity; Convention on Migratory Species: The Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals; Montreal Protocol: The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer;
Nagoya Protocol: The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity; Ramsar Convention: The Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance; Rotterdam Convention: The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade; Stockholm Convention: The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollu-
tants; UN Watercourses Convention: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses; Vienna
Convention: The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
Source: Based on data from the United Nations Information Portal on Multilateral Environmental Agreements (informea.org).
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region. For most of this time, GCC countries were conceived as indispensable for a reliable supply of
carbon resources, and they still currently hold around 30% of oil and around 20% of global gas
reserves (BP 2018). In this period of high and “carefree” growth, GCC countries’ attitudes towards
global action on emerging sustainability issues, particularly climate change, have often reflected
the fear of hurting their carbon industries or a reluctance to engage with what they saw as an unac-
ceptable trade-off between growth and sustainability. Such reluctance should be seen through the
lens of the transformation of negotiating positions of developing nations as well as the special
role of GCC within that group. Najam (2005) explains that developing countries reluctantly joined
the 1972 Stockholm conference and saw environmental concerns as an effort by the Global North
to sabotage the Global South’s development aspirations. They questioned the construction of the
global environmental agenda, saw development and poverty eradication as a remedy for environ-
mental problems and thus, during the 1980s and the 1992 Rio conference, contributed through
this discourse to the emergence of sustainable development as a broader and more acceptable
global paradigm (Najam 2005). The GCC positions went even further than the scepticism of develop-
ing countries. GCC countries have been, and still are to some extent, an opposing force to global
agreements related to low-carbon economic growth or climate change combat. Out of (unjustified)
fear for the future of carbon supply and prices, OPEC countries, particularly Middle Eastern ones often
represented through the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), demanded compensation,
reduction of carbon taxes in developed countries and, to the detriment of the long-term interests
of developing countries and the G77, blocked progress through delay, refusal, doubt and obstruction
tactics (Barnett 2008). At the same time, Saudi Arabia heavily dominated the obstructionism bloc to
climate action and influenced the G77 group’s attitudes. This continued until the early 2000s when
the first signs of reorientation of the Saudi approach emerged, namely the acceptance of partici-
pation and acknowledgement of the severity of the climate issue (Depledge 2008).
While GGC countries have led the global opposition to climate change action, there has been
some level of participation in other parts of the global sustainability agenda through signing and rati-
fying environmental global agreements. Table 1 shows participation in major agreements, indicating
intensified engagement since the 1990s, and particularly in the last two decades. It took some GCC
countries almost four decades to sign agreements from the Stockholm conference era on endan-
gered species or wetlands, while most recent agreements such as climate change, desertification
and pollution were joined rapidly. It is important to note that GCC states have exhibited some
regional environmental activism towards priority topics such as coastal and marine ecosystems.
For example, during the 1970s, Kuwait developed a regional convention known as the Regional
Organization for the Protection of Marine Environment (ROPME) for the Gulf region, under the aus-
pices of the 1972-established United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). This topic became
even more urgent for GCC countries after several accidents and the 1991 oil spill in the aftermath of
the Gulf War (Nadim, Bagtzoglou, and Iranmahboob 2008).
Environmental renaissance, post-growth and the new global agenda
The opposing attitudes of GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia towards carbon reduction agreements
continued throughout later conferences such as the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustain-
able Development (WSSD) and during meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COPs) of the
UNFCCC. For example, Saudi Arabia was one of the few countries to not engage in efforts towards
a comprehensive decision during the 2009 Copenhagen conference (COP 15) (Dimitrov 2010;
Dryzek and Stevenson 2011). However, as with many developing countries, participation and engage-
ment in the global environmental agenda grew steadily after the 1992 conference in the face of the
transformation of environmental discourse driven by environmental professionals as well as new
actors such as civil society and epistemic communities (Najam 2005). At the same time, the functions
of UN conferences within environmental diplomacy have changed over the last decades, as evident
in the perceived failures of the 2002 Johannesburg conference and the 2009 Copenhagen
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conference. These conferences have become platforms that incorporate a more constructive agenda
geared towards educating governments and exposing new discourses (Haas 2002). This is while the
opposition to accords in such summits has been increasingly used symbolically to enact legitimacy
and mobilise national audiences, without necessarily distracting from the real business of addressing
environmental issues (Death 2011).
For GCC countries, one can postulate a noticeable engagement over the last decade in the global
development and environmental governance structures. There are many drivers and manifestations
of this engagement. First, GCC countries have reached a high development phase and have started to
advance on measures to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation and ecologi-
cally modernise their economies. Al-Saidi and Elagib (2018) reviewed these measures, which largely
rely on engagement in global markets to import clean technologies, set up knowledge industries,
increase energy certifications in buildings, and construct low-carbon cities. After decades of
growth, GCC countries are increasingly portraying themselves as showcases of modernity, a
premise that, if achieved, should also include sustainability and environmental awareness. Further-
more, these countries have emerged as important players in development aid, decades after some
countries were still receiving significant aid amounts themselves (Table 2).
Second, GCC countries are now crafting their independence (from Saudi dominance) with regard
to environmental diplomacy and global engagement. The prime examples are Qatar and UAE. Prior to
the fall of oil prices in 2014, Qatar had been actively engaged in climate diplomacy by hosting the
COP18 in Doha and proposing a proactive regional climate of cooperation on research and knowl-
edge production. The fiscal difficulties of GCC countries following the oil price fall might have
incited a more cautionary approach of GCC governments, and a change of priority towards
gradual change through economic diversification instead of immediate action and ambitious
environmental policies. For example, the UAE in 2009 hosted the newly established International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Masdar City, a megacity originally established to be the
world’s first zero-carbon city. However, the city did not achieve this as the principles of economic
profitability and entrepreneurship in clean technologies began to predominate environmental sus-
tainability (Cugurullo 2016). Still, the UAE has adopted a benefits-oriented approach toward the
global environmental governance as it implements key concepts of the global agenda through mul-
tiple international partnerships such as the green economy concept, adopted during the 2012 Rio +
20 conference (Luomi 2015).
Third, there are serious internal drivers for GCC countries to decrease national energy footprints,
adopt renewables and increase awareness. Above all, due to rising populations and economies, the
increasing domestic oil consumption in countries such as Saudi Arabia, combined with subsided
prices, could result in a rapid decline of oil exports and revenues (Gately, Al-Yousef, and Al-Sheikh
2012). Therefore, immediate action on alternative sources, subsidy reductions and efficiency
measures are needed since oil revenue dependence is still very high despite four decades of diver-
sification plans in Saudi Arabia, for example (Albassam 2015). In this context, for GCC countries, their
Table 2. Key socio-economic and development aid data of GCC countries.
Population
(millions in
2017)a
GDP (Current
US$ billions in
2017)a
GDP per capital
(US$ thousands in
2017 with PPP)a
Highest 3 years of net ODA and official
aid received between 1960 and 2000
(US$ billions) (constant 2015 US$)a
Development
aid (Current
US$ billions)b
Bahrain 1.5 35 48 0.655 (1983) 0.605 (1976) 0.5 (1980) –
Kuwait 4.1 120 72 0.029 (1996) 0.025 (1981) 0.024 (1980) 1 (2016)
Oman 4.6 73 42 1.24 (1977) 0.735 (1974) 0.712 (1998) –
Qatar 2.6 168 128 0.008 (1999) 0.007 (1989) 0.007 (2002) 1.3 (2013)
Saudi Arabia 33 684 54 0.114 (1982) 0.05 (1960) 0.047 (1992) 3.5 (2010)
United Arab
Emirates
9.4 383 74 0.210 (1987) 0.119 (1977) 0.034 (1971) 4.6 (2017)
aBased on World Bank data (data.worldbank.org).
bCompiled from OECD (2012) “Multilateral Aid Report”, and OECD (2018) “Development Co-operation Report 2018”.
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contributions to global agreements such as the SDGs or the Paris Agreement are seen in line with
their diversification efforts, something that might for the first time create some congruence with
the global sustainability agenda. This is despite the ongoing lack of regional coordination, or national
policies or strategies that outline commitments to these global agreements (Sever, Evren Tok, and
D’Alessandro 2019).
The rise of national visions and the Saudi Arabia factor
Collectively, GCC countries are engaged in reducing dependency on fossil fuels due to the various
drawbacks it brings. They have established national visions built closely around the ideals of econ-
omic sustainability through diversification, efficiency and long-term rate of return on investments
in sectors such as education. In fact, national visions for accelerating reforms are not new to the
region, as the next section shows. However, the difference this time might be significant since
Saudi Arabia, by far the GCC region’s biggest country, has joined the transformation with a bold
national plan driven by the need to diversify the economy, reduce domestic consumption and
curb waste and inefficiencies. Housing the two major holy mosques and being the world’s biggest
oil exporter, the political, legal and economic changes of the past few years will have ramifications
across the region and could alter diplomacy and negotiation attitudes of the GCC in the global
environmental arena. The Kingdom’s top officials including the Council of Ministers experienced a
major transformation, while various legislation has been considerably modified and regulation of
all sectors has been put in place (Al Surf and Mostafa 2017). However, Moshashai, Leber, and
Savage (2018) examined this ongoing transformation and noted the existence of major challenges
such as the need for transparency and efficiency in public spending, effective decision-making, pol-
itical stability and trust of foreign investors or multilateral organisations. In this context, the current
transition of alliances and tense diplomatic relations after the 2017 GCC crisis following the Saudi-led
embargo on Qatar has the potential of increasing instability, cementing regional rivalry, and hamper-
ing progress in the GCC region towards a common sustainability and diversification agenda.
State comparisons and national contexts
The GCC region has been quite homogenous with regard to the dependence on economic carbon
exports, congruence in the growth trajectory and economic policies since the 1970s and, to a
large extent, a unified position in environmental diplomacy. Further, with arguably the most oil-
dependent countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait now adopting ambitious national visions in 2016
and 2017, respectively, GCC countries seem united in their economic transformation efforts.
However, this common approach of national visions has varying emphases and paces of reform
implementation. Table 3 summarises the national visions and whether they incorporate key elements
of the global sustainability agenda. There are some notable commonalities in the history of the
national visions and their accompanying strategies. First, these visions are, more than ever, aligned
with the spirit of the global sustainability agenda, in incorporating environmental sustainability as
a key development pillar or an instrument to achieve other pillars. Second, there are recurrent priori-
ties represented by the underlying planning principles of increasing diversification, local entrepre-
neurship, knowledge base and health infrastructure. Third, ecological or sustainability issues such
as renewable energies, energy efficiency, clean technologies (so-called ecological innovations) or
reduction of subsidies seem to find more emphasis in recently established visions. Alternatively,
they were incorporated into subsequent development plans and strategies of older visions. Finally,
it is worth noting that the global sustainability agenda, conventions or global agreements like the
Paris Agreement and the SDGs, do not feature directly in any of these visions.
Some countries stand out as higher achievers with regard to sustainability issues. Qatar and the
UAE were some of the first countries in the region to put sustainability issues as an equal pillar. In
Qatar, environmental development constitutes one of the four pillars in its national vision of 2008
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Table 3. Sustainability issues in the national visions of GCC countries.
Bahrain Vision 2030
Kuwait National
Development Plan 2035/
New Kuwait Oman Vision 2020
Qatar National Vision
2030 Vision 2030 National Agenda 2021/Vision 2021
Launch year 2008 2017 1995 2008 2016 2010
Main pillars Economy,
government,
society
Global position,
infrastructure, human
capital, public
administration,
healthcare, economy,
living environment
Economic balance and
sustainability, human
resource development,
economic diversification,
private sector
development
Economic development,
social development,
human development,
environmental
development
A vibrant society (culture,
urbanism etc.), a thriving
economy (competition,
employment etc.), an
ambitious nation (non-oil
revenues, public
administration, household
incomes)
World-class healthcare,
competitive knowledge
economy, safe public and fair
judiciary, cohesive society and
preserved identity, sustainable
environment and infrastructure,
first-rate education system
Renewable energy
targets according
to sub-strategies (%
of total capacity)
5% (2020) 15% (2030) 10% (2020) 20% (2030) 9.5 gigawatts by 2023 and 54
gigawatts by 2040 (but new
announced projects state 200
gigawatts by 2030)
24% (2021)
Reference in the national visions to the following issues
Environmental
sustainability as
guiding principle
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Environmental issues
as sub-goals or
secondary
principles
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Climate change and
warming
Partly (carbon
emissions)
No No Yes No No
Ecological footprints,
waste and
consumption,
awareness
Partly
(overconsumption
of scarce resources)
Partly (solid waste
management)
Partly (under the 9th five-
year plan 2016–2020)
Yes Yes Yes
Energy efficiency Yes No Partly (under the 9th five-
year plan 2016–2020)
No Partly (energy mix, renewables) Partly (clean energy)
Subsidies reductions/
improved targeting
Yes No No No Yes No
Ecosystems and
marine issues
Partly (nature spaces) Partly (environmental
safety)
Partly (under the 9th five-
year plan 2016–2020)
Yes Yes Partly (water indicators)
Ecological
innovations and
sustainable
technologies
No No No Partly (advanced
technologies to
reduce impacts of
projects)
No No
Global sustainability
agenda
No No No No No No
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with some targets being quite unique in the GCC context, such as stressing regional environmental
cooperation or aspiring to a “proactive role” in explicit “support for international efforts” towards
climate change. The incorporation of these targets can be seen within the earlier-mentioned environ-
mental diplomacy of Qatar prior to 2014. They are rarely reflected in recent follow-ups nor has the
envisioned national climate strategy been developed yet. Similarly, the 2010 UAE’s vision has
some clear links to international agreements and heavily relies on established global indicators for
progress monitoring.
For the other GCC countries, a clear bias towards economic considerations is apparent. This is
more evident in the case of Oman and Bahrain, which are comparatively less wealthy due to
lower oil and gas resources. Sustainability in Bahrain’s vision is understood as economic sustainability
while environmental protection targets are embedded under the third pillar of the living environ-
ment of citizens. Oman’s national vision dates back to the mid-1990s and will be replaced by the
Oman Vision 2040 later this year. Oman Vision 2020 is less oriented by sustainability concerns,
some of which (e.g. energy efficiency and environmental protection) were later embedded in the
targets of the 9th Development Plan (2016–20) under this vision. For the revenue-rich countries,
and latecomers in terms of their respective national visions, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the focus is
rather on bold diversification policies and megaprojects. During the COP 24 of 2018, both Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait joined the USA and Russia to block a motion to “welcome” the latest report by
the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was later merely “noted” by the
delegates, thus watering down support for the report. The two countries’ priorities are arguably
not climate change or carbon reduction. Kuwait’s vision emphasises diversification, human capacities
and health, while the large investments under the environmental pillar target refinery capacities.
Saudi Arabia’s vision set quite broadly-formulated goals to be implemented through economic
reforms, investments and costly megaprojects. A comprehensive list of environmental issues is
given under the environmental sustainability goal as a level-2 objective, later translated through
only three level-3 objectives on pollution, natural threats and landscapes. In the visions of all GCC
countries, there are certain underrepresented topics such as climate change, subsidies and sustain-
able technologies (e.g. renewables, innovations for carbon reduction etc.). However, even if men-
tioned, rarely do subsequent strategies systematically reflect critical topics.
Reflections and discussion
The urge to change economic priorities in the GCC has become greater than ever before. In countries
such as Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, it represents a race against time as it has become evident
that domestic growth and resource use inefficiency will jeopardise the major revenue stream of oil
and gas exports. The current reforms could reduce some carbon and energy intensities, and effec-
tively push these countries further down the road of engagement within the global sustainability
agenda. For other countries such as Qatar and UAE, global sustainability engagement has a longer
history dating back to the era of high oil prices before the 2014 crisis and is also motivated by a
rivalry for demonstrating modernity and avant-gardism. Some scholars have put forward other
factors behind the current reforms and the global engagement, namely the new generation of
“neo-liberal” leaders in Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia or Bahrain. These leaders want to reform the old
model of fiscal reliance on oil and gas and share a common vision, partly inspired by the “Dubai
model” of an economy financed by tourism, property markets, and fees and taxes paid by expatriates
(Gengler and Lambert 2016). However, it is doubtful whether these elements of charisma and econ-
omic ideology are enough to push the reforms. It is also difficult to conceptualise how economic
diversification would have happened without the real politico-economic pressures from the prospect
of dwindling resources in the future. Further, the GCC crisis related to the embargo on Qatar invokes
the recurrent notion of regional rivalry and increased independence of GCC states’ environmental
policies. For example, the UAE opted to build up its nuclear power instead of importing gas from
Qatar for fear of dependence and other political considerations (Fattouh, Rogers, and Stewart
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2015). This is while both countries are engaged in developing their own energy certification systems
for buildings, something that would otherwise be a suitable field for common approaches and
cooperation. Furthermore, regional cooperation on climate change policies, carbon trade, capture
or sequestration is almost non-existent (Meltzer, Hultman, and Langley 2014). While the UAE has
invested heavily in importing clean technologies and enhancing multilateral partnerships on sustain-
able development planning, Qatar might choose to out-triumph this global outreach in light of the
imposed embargo, also through hosting upcoming global events such as the 2022 World Cup.
While the engagement of GCC countries in the global sustainability agenda has notably increased,
it remains uneven in terms of topical coverage as well as cautious in terms of official commitments.
National visions and diversification pressures have played a positive role in addition to the fact that
the global agenda became broader and more acceptable. This agenda expanded from the environ-
ment-versus-development debate of the 1970s, to the comprehensive sustainable development
agenda of 80s and 90s, to the latter ideas of green economy and growth. The new agenda prioritises
industry and envisions win-win outcomes through technologies and innovations. Nonetheless, the
commitment of GCC countries to participate and engage with this agenda falls shy of benchmarks
set by developed countries and also from the Arab region. For example, Morocco plans to supply
over 50% of electricity from renewables by 2030, much more than any GCC country. At the same
time, GCC countries do not have clear commitments or carbon reduction targets. Their reporting
on agreements such as the SDGs or the Paris Agreement is often merely listing progress indictors
from their national visions and strategies, which in turn do not directly link to these agreements
or reflect a broader transition towards sustainability. Further, while domestic factors and outside
pressures from multilateral organisations have pushed GCC countries to adopt important subsidy
reduction reforms, these reforms face serious political challenges and might not alter the rent-distri-
buting nature of the GCC states (Krane 2018). Some of the reductions also only apply to the expatriate
population, thus incentives for waste, inefficiency and large environmental footprints still exist.
Conclusions
Environmental diplomacy of GCC countries can be traced back to their participation modes in
shaping, joining or obstructing the global sustainability agenda based on their national economic
interests. GCC societies have historically utilised and preserved coastal landscapes and limited fresh-
water resources for sustaining their livelihoods as well as seafaring and trade relationships with other
nations. With the discovery of oil, and later in the second half of the twentieth century, the increase of
oil production and control, the carbon-based economic model became indispensable for national
wealth accumulation and for the global energy supply. The obstructionism and reluctance of GCC
countries towards multilateral environmental agreements date back to this era and now represent
relics that did not completely disappear. However, over time, particularly due to the broadening of
the global sustainability agenda, the decline of oil supply power and the growth consolidation of
GCC countries, Gulf states have started joining multilateral agreements, engaging in international
development and incorporating certain elements of the sustainability agenda. Despite increased par-
ticipation, the positions of GCC countries remained unified and dominated by Saudi Arabia’s attitudes
of obstruction and compensation-seeking towards any action on critical issues such as decarbonisa-
tion or climate change. Nowadays, GCC countries have started to join the global consensus and
engage with it. This is particularly true for the now relatively autonomous environmental policies
of the small and reserves-rich states with global ambitious, for example, UAE and Qatar.
The recent transformation efforts of GCC countries towards a more diversified, low-carbon, knowl-
edge-based and resource-efficient economic model are significant for many reasons. First, they are
driven by genuine domestic pressures of rising demands and declining future revenues. Second,
they are common to all countries and incorporated in a relatively similar fashion within ambitious
national visions. Thus, continuing this track might lead to tangible results in terms of reductions of
carbon intensities, environmental footprints and waste. Third, crucial accompanying reforms such
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as subsidy reductions and social reforms can help carry this momentum, although they are still not
comprehensive. Fourth, GCC countries are using multilateral partnerships facilitated by the global
environmental governance systems for imports or clean technologies or developing national strat-
egies (e.g. green growth in the UAE), while they are engaged in tracking progress towards their com-
mitments to global agreements.
Despite these positive signs, the reforms represent a cautious progress towards the global sustain-
ability agenda, which remains uneven across the countries and, generally, finds little direct reflection
in their respective national development policies. The region remains an underperformer in regional
or global contexts with regard to implementing this global agenda. At the same time, political crises
and ineffective regional cooperation among GCC countries continue to pose an impediment for pro-
spects of a speedy implementation of key parts of this agenda such as climate policies, renewables or
clean transport.
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